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In an attempt to explain male-female wage di￿erential, I estimated the rel-
ative marginal productivity and relative wage of female workers compared
to those of male workers using panel data of Japanese ￿rms. The relative
wage of female workers is also estimated from the same data. Cross-sectional
estimates that neglect ￿rm-level, ￿xed e￿ects indicate that the marginal pro-
ductivity of female workers is 44 percent of that of male workers, while female
wage is 31 percent of that of male workers. These estimates indicate that part
of the wage di￿erential cannot be explained by the productivity di￿erential.
However, the IV estimates that allow for ￿rm-level, ￿xed e￿ects indicate that
both female marginal productivity and wage are about 50 percent of those of
male workers. Thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination
against female workers once the selection of workers into productive and high
paying ￿rms is accounted for. Evidence found in this study is consistent with
the existence of employer sex discrimination at the point of job entry, but
not afterward.
Keywords: Sex Discrimination, Wage, Productivity, Panel Data, Fixed
E￿ects
JEL Classi￿cation Code: J311 Introduction
Wage di￿erentials between the sexes are observed worldwide, and these dif-
ferentials have persisted for a long time. Labor economists, as well as the
general public, have argued about why these sex-wage di￿erentials exist.
There are two major explanations for the sex wage di￿erential (of course,
this is not an exhaustive list of such explanations). First, the wage di￿erential
simply may re￿ect the productivity di￿erential between two sexes. Second,
the di￿erential may be due to employer sex discrimination. If the marginal
female worker is employed by a discriminatory employer, then a male-female
wage di￿erential emerges in the market equilibrium.
Labor economists have been using multiple regression to distinguish these
two hypotheses. They regress the log of wage on independent variables that
presumably capture workers’ productivity and the residual male-female wage
di￿erential is attributed to sex discrimination. However, drawing a de￿nitive
conclusion from this regression is di￿cult because the productivity di￿er-
ential between the sexes that cannot be observed may be included in the
residual, as discussed in Becker [1985] (See Altonji and Blank [1999] for this
literature).
In an attempt to overcome the di￿culties mentioned above, this paper
directly estimates the relative productivity of male and female workers by es-
timating the production function using Japanese ￿rm-level panel data. This
estimated productivity di￿erential is compared with the wage di￿erential es-
1timated from individual ￿rms’ accounting data. This exercise reveals whether
the wage di￿erential is due to the productivity di￿erential. This approach
has been employed by Hellerstein and Neumark [1999] and Hellerstein et al.
[1999] to analyze Israeli and US cross-sectional data respectively. They found
supportive evidence for sex discrimination in the US but not in Israel; they
found a larger sex wage gap than productivity gap in the US, but not in
Israel.
It is worth mentioning a related approach for identifying sex discrimina-
tion using ￿rm-level data. This approach examines the empirical implication
of employers’ discrimination theory. If the sex composition of workers in
each ￿rm is determined to maximize its pro￿t, the sex composition of work-
ers should not a￿ect a ￿rms’ pro￿ts after conditioning on output and input
prices because of the envelope theorem (Hotelling’s lemma). This result no
longer holds once the ￿rms’ objectives include satisfying the employers’ pref-
erence for sex discrimination. If employers’ objectives are heterogeneous and
the equilibrium male-female wage di￿erential re￿ects discrimination against
women, then those employers without discriminatory preferences against
women should hire more women and earn higher pro￿ts than discrimina-
tory employers. This hypothesis was tested by Hellerstein et al. [2002] using
US data and by Kawaguchi [2003] using the Japanese ￿rm-level panel data
that are used in this paper. Both papers found evidence that is consistent
with the existence of sex discrimination. Kawaguchi [2003] also found that
the ￿rms that persistently earn high pro￿ts tend to hire fewer women; thus,
2cross-sectional estimates of the e￿ect of female proportion on pro￿t are likely
to be biased downward. However the estimates implied that most of the
male-female wage di￿erential is the product of the productivity di￿erential.
This paper attempts to complement Kawaguchi [2003] by obtaining struc-
tural parameters, and consequently, it sheds light on the mechanism of the
male-female wage di￿erential more directly. Panel data adds a bene￿cial fea-
ture to this study that is preferable to previous structural studies by Heller-
stein and Neumark [1999] and Hellerstein et al. [1999]. Using this panel data,
I can allow for the heterogeneity in the individual ￿rms’ productivity that
may be correlated with the sex composition of their workers. Controlling
for unobserved technological heterogeneity across ￿rms is important because
those ￿rms with productive technology may well accommodate female work-
ers, while at the same time earning higher pro￿ts due to their productive
technology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
structural model of the production function and wage equation. This section
also discusses the method of estimation. Section 3 explains the data used in
this study. Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Structural Model
To estimate the marginal product of the labor of male and female workers,
I need to specify the functional form of the production function. I assume
the Cobb-Douglas production function, as in Hellerstein and Neumark [1999]







where i and t are the subscripts for ￿rm and time respectively, ai is the ￿rm-
speci￿c, time-constant technology, ql is the labor input that is measured in
e￿ciency units, k is capital input, m is the intermediate input, and u is
the unobserved idiosyncratic shock to production. The labor input in the
e￿ciency unit is the weighted sum of the numbers of male employees and
female employees as follows:




where lm stands for the number of male employees, lf stands for the number
of female employees, and l stands for the total number of employees. The
parameter   indicates the relative productivity of female workers to male
workers. By taking a logarithm of (1) and substituting (2) into ql, we obtain:
lnyit = ai+￿ln(lit(1+( ￿1)(
lf
l
)it))+￿ lnkit+￿ lnmit+ind￿+year￿ +uit:
(3)
I included one-digit industry dummies (in nine categories) to allow for the
di￿erences in a across industries. Time dummies presumably capture the
e￿ect of macro-economic shocks and in￿ation. Parameters in this equation
can be consistently estimated by a pooled, nonlinear, least-squares estimation
under the strict exogeneity assumption of idiosyncratic error:
E(uitjai;li;fi;ki;mi;ind;year) = 0 (4)
4and the strict exogeneity of ￿rm-speci￿c technology:
E(aijli;fi;ki;mi;ind;year) = 0 (5)
where xi ￿ [xi1;xi2;::::;xiT]. The second assumption is violated when an
individual ￿rm has its own technology, which a￿ects the optimal input mix.
This assumption is relaxed by estimating (3) by a nonlinear instrument vari-
able estimation, using the following mean deviation variables as instruments:










);(lnkit ￿ ￿ lnki);(lnmit ￿ ￿ lnmi); (6)
where ￿ xi = (1=T)
PT
t=1 xit. These instrumental variables xit ￿ ￿ xi are cor-
related with xit, if xit is time variant, and not correlated with ai because
E[(xit￿￿ xi)ai] = E[(xit￿(1=T)
PT




The estimated relative productivity of women is compared to the relative
wage of women. The data used in this study contain the total wage bill,
but do not contain its sex breakdown. Thus, I estimate the relative wage of
women under the assumption that all ￿rms behave as price takers. The total
wage bill is de￿ned as:








where wbit is the wage bill, wm is male wage, wf is female wage, and lambda
is the relative female wage to male wage. This equation is a de￿nitional
equation, rather than a behavioral equation. I estimate this equation by tak-
ing a natural logarithm and allowing for unobserved factors. The estimation
5equation is:
ln(wbit=lit) = lnwm + ln(1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(
lf
l
)it) + ind￿ + year￿ + eit; (8)
where eit is the error term that satis￿es E(eitjlm;it;lf;it;ind;year) = 0. I
included industry dummies, assuming that the inter-industry wage di￿eren-
tial could persist because of friction in the labor movement across industries.
Year dummies capture the e￿ect of in￿ation or macro-economic shock. This
estimated relative wage of women ￿ is compared to the relative female pro-
ductivity  . A consistent estimation of parameters is possible via NL2SLS
when independent variables are exogenous.
3 Data
I used the basic survey of ￿rms’ activity collected by the Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry (METI) of the Japanese government to implement the
test. The survey is a ￿rm-level census survey that covers all ￿rms that hire
more than 50 employees and hold more than 30 million yen in capital. The
available data cover 7 years, 1992 and every year between 1995 and 2000;
and the sample size is about 25,000 ￿rms for each year. From the data
sets, I extracted each ￿rm’s total sales, sales cost, or overhead cost, data on
the ￿rm’s employees, such as the number of employees with sex breakdown,
the book value of its ￿xed assets, the year of the ￿rm’s origin, and the
three-digit code indicating the industry in which the ￿rm operates. There
were originally 180,838 ￿rm-year observations in the 7 years of data, but
6after excluding observations with missing sales information or inconsistent
employee records, there remained 177,868 ￿rm-year observations. The survey
record unfortunately does not distinguish missing values and zeros, except
when a ￿rm did not answer the entire survey. Since replying to the survey
is compulsory due to the Statistics Law and because the METI exerts its
best e￿ort to ￿ll in the missing values with a follow-up phone survey, missing
values are presumably rare. Thus, all values of zero in the record are treated
as actual zeros.
The descriptive statistics of the analysis sample are reported in Table 1.
4 Results
4.1 Nonlinear, Least-Squares Estimates
The results of separate estimations of the production function (3) and the
wage equation (8) appear in Table 2. The estimate of   indicates that the
marginal product of female workers is 44 percent of that of male workers.
On the other hand, the estimate of ￿ indicates that female workers earn 31
percent of what male workers earn.
Table 3 reports the results of the joint estimation of the production func-
tion and wage equation, allowing for the correlation of error terms across
equations. A generalized, non-linear, least-squares estimation was applied for
the system, using the estimated variance matrix under the homoscedasticity
assumption as the weight. The point estimates virtually did not change from
the results of the separate estimations, but standard errors grew by about ten
7times. This joint estimation allows us to estimate   ￿ ￿ and the associated
standard error. The estimate of the di￿erence is 0 :14, with a standard error
of 0:08. Thus, the null hypothesis of no discrimination against women, which
is H0 :   ￿ ￿ = 0, is marginally rejected (t = 1:75) at a 10% signi￿cance
level.
If we take the point estimates seriously, of the 69 percentage points of
wage di￿erentials observed in data, 14 percentage points cannot be explained
in the productivity di￿erence between men and women. Thus 20 percent of
male-female wage di￿erential (=0.14/0.69) arguably can be attributed to
employers’ discrimination.
4.2 Nonlinear IV Estimates (Fixed E￿ects Estimates)
The pooled, non-linear, least-squares estimator discussed in the previous sec-
tion is a consistent estimator when each ￿rm’s time- constant, unobserved
heterogeneity is not correlated with the ￿rm’s input mix. This is a rather
restrictive assumption because if there is ￿rm-speci￿c heterogeneity in pro-
duction technology, then the optimal input mix is likely to be heterogenous. If
each ￿rm’s technological heterogeneity is correlated with inputs, the pooled,
non-linear, least-squares estimator is an inconsistent estimator. To work
around this potential endogeneity issue, the production function and wage
equations are estimated via a non-linear, instrumental variable estimation
using the mean deviation of explanatory variables from each ￿rm’s mean.
These mean deviation variables are not correlated with ￿rms’ time-constant,
8unobserved heterogeneity by its construction. In this estimation, only within-
￿rm variations of input mix over time are used for the identi￿cation. To as-
sure that the idiosyncratic error term of (3) is exogenous from each ￿rm’s
mean of independent variables, the strict exogeneity of the error term stated
as (4) is required.
I also allow for the ￿rm’s time-constant heterogeneity in the wage equation
(8) and estimate the following wage equation:
ln((wb=l)it) = lnwm + ln(1 + (￿ ￿ 1)
lfit
lit
) + ind￿ + year￿ + di + eit; (9)
where di is time-constant, ￿rm-level, unobserved heterogeneity that a￿ects
the per capita labor cost. This ￿rm-level heterogeneity could arise due to
the heterogeneity of workers’ quality across ￿rms. Even if ￿rms operate in a
perfectly competitive labor market and pay the same wage for an e￿ciency
unit of labor, those ￿rms that hire eligible workers pay a higher wage per
capita. If the quality of workers in a speci￿c ￿rm is time-constant, then the
e￿ect of heterogeneity of workers’ quality is captured by di. If male workers
are more skilled on average, di and female worker proportion are negatively
correlated. Accordingly, the pooled, non-linear, least-squares estimator of ￿
is downward inconsistent. On the other hand, a non-linear IV estimation
that uses the mean deviation of independent variables from each ￿rm’s mean
renders a consistent estimator.
Table 4 reports the results of the non-linear, least-squares estimation
applied to each equation separately. The result in Column (1) shows that
9female workers’ productivity relative to male workers’ is 55 percent. Com-
pared with the cross-sectional estimate reported in Column (1) of Table 2,
this number is 11 percentage points higher, which implies that ai and
lfit
lit
are negatively correlated. We can roughly test whether these two estimates
are signi￿cantly di￿erent in a statistical sense by using Hausman statistics.
Under the homoscedasticity assumption for the idiosyncratic error term, the
non-linear, least-squares estimator is an e￿cient estimator under the null of
no correlation between ai and
lfit
lit . Accordingly, Hausman statistics can be
constructed for the di￿erence of these two estimators as
H = ( ^  NLIV ￿ ^  NL)
2=(V ar( ^  NLIV ) ￿ V ar( ^  NL)) ￿ ￿(1): (10)
for the two estimates, ^ H = 4:89 (p = 0:03), and thus we can conclude that
the two estimates are di￿erent in a statistical sense. The implied positive
correlation between ai and
lfit
lit is consistent with the hypothesis that ￿rms
with a technological advantage hire fewer women because employers face less
pressure of market competition and have room to indulge their preference for
discrimination against females. This ￿nding is consistent with the ￿nding in
Kawaguchi [2003]. This earlier study found that ￿rms with a persistent,
high-pro￿t factor tend to hire fewer women.
As for the relative payment to female workers, Column (2) of Table 4
shows that they receive 52 percent of male workers’ wage. The di￿erence be-
tween this estimate and the cross-sectional estimate is 0.21 (=0.52-0.31), and
the Hausman statistics for this di￿erence are ^ H = 459:38 (p < 0:000). This
10di￿erence of estimates implies that high-paying ￿rms tend to hire fewer fe-
male workers. Di￿erent from the results of the pooled, non-linear estimation,
this relative payment is very comparable to relative productivity. Once con-
ditioned on the ￿rms where they work, female workers seem to receive their
wage according to their productivity. To make this point more rigorously, I
estimated the production function and wage equation jointly by using a non-
linear 3-step, least-squares technique and estimating ￿￿￿ and the associated
standard error. The estimation result appears in Table 5. Due to the corre-
lation of the idiosyncratic error terms of the two equations, the estimates for
the production function di￿er from the estimates from the previous, separate
estimation. Now the relative productivity of female workers to male workers
is estimated to be 50 percent, while the relative payment is 52 percent. The
parameter ￿ ￿ ￿ is precisely estimated to be ￿0:02 (s:e = 0:0006). This
di￿erence is economically negligible. From this result, I conclude that rela-
tive wage of female workers compared to that of male workers re￿ects their
relative productivity if they work for the same company.
4.3 Discussion
A comparison of the pooled, non-linear estimates and the IV non-linear esti-
mates reveals that women are less likely to work in higher productivity and
higher wage ￿rms (i.e. Cov(di;(lf=l)it) < 0 in (3) and Cov(ai;(lf=l)it) < 0
in (9)). Female workers’ selection into low productivity ￿rms may be due to
their low productivity because high technology and high skills can be com-
11plemented in the production process, or simply a part of ai may re￿ect the
workers’ skill level.
The fact that I did not ￿nd a larger male-female wage di￿erential than
productivity di￿erential does not imply the non-existence of discrimination
against women because I cannot pinpoint the reason why women are less
productive. This may be simply because women are less productive or be-
cause employers with productive technology discriminate against women at
the time of hiring. Taking an example from anti-age-discrimination legisla-
tion, Posner [1999] pointed out that many legal disputes are observed among
workers and ￿rms that are already have contracts, for example when there
are issues related to dismissal, promotion, or wage payment. Job applicants
who are rejected for a reason that may be due to discrimination have only
a weak incentive to sue the ￿rms because they can try other employers who
may be non-discriminatory. Thus, discrimination is likely to occur at the
entry point of jobs. This discussion also may apply to the Japanese case.
Further investigation is needed to determine whether there is discrimination
against women. In particular, why women are less likely to work in less pro-
ductive and low wage ￿rms should be investigated, perhaps using employer-
employee matched data.
5 Conclusion
In an attempt to explain the male-female wage di￿erential, I estimated the
relative marginal productivity and relative wage of female workers to male
12workers using a panel data of Japanese ￿rms. Estimates that were obtained
by neglecting individual ￿rm’s heterogeneity indicated that the wage di￿er-
ential is larger than the productivity di￿erential between female and male
workers. Preferable estimates indicate that the marginal productivity of fe-
male workers is 44 percent of that of male workers while the female wage
is 31 percent of that of male workers. These estimates are consistent with
employers’ discrimination against women.
However, the IV estimates, which allow for correlated ￿rm-level Hetero-
geneity, indicated that both female workers’ marginal productivity and wage
are around 50 percent of male workers’. Thus we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis of no discrimination against female workers once the selection of
workers into ￿rms is controlled for.
We cannot draw a de￿nitive conclusion regarding why female workers are
likely to select into low productivity and low paying ￿rms from this data.
It may be either because of their lower skill or because of the discrimina-
tion against them. This evidence could be consistent with the employers’
discrimination against women at the entry point to the higher paying jobs.
More detailed study on the selection of workers into ￿rms is very impor-
tant to identify the reason for the male-female wage di￿erential.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Sample Period: 1992, 1995-2000 
Number of Observations: 177868 (Number of Firms: 37131) 
Variable Name  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Log (Total Sales)  8.68  1.29 
Log (Wage Bill/Total Employment)  1.48  0.40 
Log (Total Employment)  5.17  0.97 
Female Proportion  0.32  0.20 
Log (Fixed Assets)  6.99  1.62 
Log (Cost of Materials)  8.16  1.48 
Industry    
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery  0.0004   
Mining and Construction  0.02   
Light Manufacturing  0.16   
Material Manufacturing   0.17   
Electronics and Machinery  0.22   
Public Utilities and Transportation  0.003   
Wholesale and Retail  0.41   
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate  0.001   
Service 0.02   
  16
Table 2: Non-Linear Separate Estimation of the Production Function and Wage 
Equation 
 (1)  (2) 
 Production  Function  Wage  Equation 
φ , λ 0.44  0.31 
 (0.005)  (0.002) 
Log (Employment)  0.35  - 
 (0.001)   
Log (Asset Fix)  0.04  - 
 (0.0006)   
Log (Cost Material)  0.64  - 
 (0.0007)   
Constant 1.42  1.55 
 (0.03)  (0.04) 
R
2 0.96  0.29 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Year and industry dummies are included. 
N=177868. 
 
Table 3: Non-Linear Joint GLS Estimation of the Production Function and Wage 
Equation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Production 
Function 
Wage Equation  φ  -  λ 
φ , λ  0.44 0.31 0.14 
  (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) 
Log (Employment)  0.35  -   
 (0.01)     
Log (Asset Fix)  0.04  -   
 (0.004)     
Log (Cost Material)  0.64  -   
 (0.004)     
Constant 1.42  1.55   
 (0.50)  (0.30)   




Table 4: Non-Linear IV (NL2SLS) Estimation of the Production Function and Wage 
Equation 
 (1)  (2) 
 Production  Function  Wage  Equation 
φ , λ 0.55  0.52 
 (0.05)  (0.01) 
Log (Employment)  0.30  - 
 (0.02)   
Log (Asset Fix)  0.02  - 
 (0.002)   
Log (Cost Material)  0.51  - 
 (0.05)   
Constant 2.70  1.44 
 (0.07)  (0.04) 
R
2 0.93  0.25 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Year and industry dummies are included. 
N=177868. 
 
Table 5: Non-Linear IV Joint (NL3SLS) Estimation of the Production Function and 
Wage Equation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Production 
Function 
Wage Equation  φ  -  λ 
φ , λ 0.50  0.52  -0.02 
  (0.003) (0.01) (0.006) 
Log (Employment)  0.41  -   
 (0.002)     
Log (Asset Fix)  0.00008  -   
 (0.0003)     
Log (Cost Material)  0.52  -   
 (0.0004)     
Constant 2.25  1.44   
 (0.007)  (0.004)   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Year and industry dummies are included. 
N=177868. 
 
 